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NOTES
THE EMERGENCE OF LAY INTERMEDIARIES
FURNISHING LEGAL SERVICES
TO INDIVIDUALS
The legal profession faces the emergence of a new medium for the furnish-
ing of legal services: lay intermediaries.1 Traditionally, intermediaries have
been prohibited by the legal profession as unethical2 and by the courts as
the unauthorized practice of law. The landmark Supreme Court cases of
NAACP v. Button4 and Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel.
Virginia State Bar,' in sanctioning two intermediary arrangements, have
added a new dimension: the first amendment freedoms of speech, petition
and association. As a result of these decisions a critical re-evaluation of the
past proscriptions against lay intermediaries should be made and the ramifi-
cations of permitting intermediaries to provide legal services should be
examined. The considerations involved in this analysis of intermediaries
are (1) the interests of the legal profession, (2) the rights of individuals
and (3) the interests of the organizations.
I. TYPES OF INTERMEDIARIES
The traditional position of the legal profession toward intermediaries is
incorporated in Canon 35 of the American Bar Association, Canons of
Professional Ethics. "The professional services of a lawyer should not be
controlled or exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which
I. A general definition of an intermediary is any lay agency, personal or corporate,
which intervenes between client and lawyer and controls or exploits the professional
services of a lawyer. See Canon 35, ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. A
California committee has coined the phrase "group legal services," meaning that legal
services are being performed by a member of the bar for a group of individuals who have
voluntarily formed or become a member of an organization, or for employees of a corpo-
ration or members of a labor union, or for a group who have combined for the purpose of
establishing a plan of prepaid legal services. California State Committee on Group Legal
Services, Report, 35 CAL. S.B.J. 710, 712 (1960).
2. See Canons 35 and 47, ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
3. It is an inherent power of the court to control and prevent the unauthorized prac-
tice of law by lay intermediaries. E.g., Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E.
313 (1935); Automobile Club v. Hoffmeister, 338 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960);
Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 Atl. 139 (1935).
4. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
5. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
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intervenes between client and lawyer."6 Similarly, Canon 47 prohibits the
association of attorneys with the unauthorized practice of law by lay inter-
mediaries.7 These proscriptions have curtailed the establishment of inter-
mediaries, but sufficient precedents exist to suggest that past arrangements
and those that wil arise should be divided into two distinct categories: (1)
lay agencies providing legal services for financial gain and (2) organizations
furnishing legal services to members or employees not for direct profit but
for the benefit of the recipients.' This note will be concerned exclusively
with the latter type.
Furthermore, the latter type can be subdivided into two broad patterns.
The first and predominant arrangement, utilized primarily by membership
organizations, offers legal services to members by directly employing at-
6. Canon 35 in its entirety reads:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any
lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A
lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all
relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such
intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be personal, and the responsi-
bility should be direct to his client. Charitable societies rendering aid to the in-
digents are not deemed such intermediaries.
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an association,
club or trade association, to render legal services in any matter which the organiza-
tion, as an entity, is interested, but this employment should not include the
rendering of legal services to the members of such an organization in respect of
their individual affairs.
At the time of the adoption of this Canon, some dissenters were dissatisfied with the
last paragraph. They argued that these organizations fulfilled a legitimate need of the
public and that professional standards should change in the light of modern conditions.
Special Committee on Supplements to the Canons of Professional Ethics, Report, 52
A.B.A. REP. 390 (1927).
The need and desire for this Canon was stimulated by Opinion 8 of the Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances rendered in 1925, involving an automobile association
offering legal services to its members. The Committee disapproved of the lawyers
providing legal services to members because of the division of professional fees and the
exploitation of the lawyers' professional services by the association. The opinion intimated
that the association would be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
The widespread acceptance of the traditional viewpoint is evidenced by the fact that
twenty-nine states have adopted this Canon officially by statute or court rule. In fourteen
additional states it has been adopted by non-integrated State Bar Associations. BRAND,
BAR ASsOcIATIONs, ATTORNEYS, AND JUDoES 847 (1956).
7. "No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name, to be used in aid
of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay agency, personal
or corporate." Canon 47, ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
8. Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual
Lawyer and the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 438, 452 (1964); see Weihofen,
"Practice of Law" by Non-Pecuniary Corporations: A Social Utility, 2 U. Cur. L. Rnv.
119 (1934). In the latter category financial gain, of course, may accrue to the recipients
of the legal services and indirectly to the salaried employees of the organization. Also,
some gain may accrue to the organizations, for example, by increasing their membership
or funds. However, these gains are not derived from exploiting litigation for profit.
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torneys. The principal reason for establishing such an association is that
members have legal problems of common concern.' Another motivating
force may be to secure a means of litigating for a predetermined position.'"
A third reason for joining together may be solely to establish a plan of pre-
paid insurance for legal services." The basic traditional objection to these
arrangements is that the professional services of the lawyers are controlled
by the lay agency.' 2
The second and more subtle intermediary pattern arises when the organi-
zation recommends the services of a particular lawyer not employed by the
organization.' The motivating forces for establishing this type of arrange-
ment may be any one of the reasons discussed above. Under the second
pattern, the danger of the intermediary exercising control over the attorney
is lessened, but the arrangements are nevertheless prohibited. 4
9. See People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E.
1 (1935); People ex Yel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Motorists' Ass'n, 354 Ill. 595, 188 N.E.
827 (1933); Hospital Credit Exch., Inc. v. Shapiro, 186 Misc. 658, 59 N.Y.S.2d 812
(Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1946) (collection agency for non-profit hospitals for money due from
patients); Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club, Inc., 209 N.C. 624, 184 S.E. 540 (1936);
Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 115 (C.P. 1930) (non-
profit organization for apartment house owners). The California Teachers Association
retains legal counsel for its members in matters relating to the protection of professional
rights or arising out of the members' employment. California State Committee on Group
Legal Services, Report, 39 CAL. S.B.J. 639, 675-76 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964
California Report]; cf. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
AND GRIEVANCES, Opinion 168 (1937) (counsel for manufacturers' association rendered
opinions on legal questions common to the members).
10. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (litigation to effectuate civil rights
of Negroes); People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill.
102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933) (organization for testing constitutionality of members' real
estate taxes).
11. No broad plan of prepaid insurance has been found although the arrangements
cited in notes 9 and 10 supra are, in a limited sense, prepaid insurance. Proposals for
legal expense insurance to be offered by profit-making organizations have been considered
impractical. See generally 1964 California Report 715-22.
12. From the perspective of the layman, restricting these arrangements may be made
to appear unreasonable when the proposition is stated in the following manner:
Can the average man, in order to obtain competent legal services at a reasonable
price, join with other average men and through the medium of their association
obtain such services and pay for them as a group at a lower cost per member than
each would have to pay if he were to contract for such services as an individual?
Sterling, Report of President for 1958-1959, 34 CAL. S.B.J. 803, 807 (1959).
13. E.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377
U.S. I (1964) ; Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950) (en bane);
In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 I1. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958); cf. San
Antonio Bar Ass'n v. Alamo Title Co., 360 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1962); San Antonio Bar
Ass'n v. Guardian Abstract and Title Co., 156 Tex. 7, 291 S.W.2d 697 (1956).
14. Cases cited note 13 supra. Compare In the Matter of Thibodeau, 295 Mass. 374,
3 N.E.2d 749 (1936), with In the Matter of Maclub of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3
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The strongest impetus to institute intermediary arrangements of either
type has originated within labor unions." However, such attempts have
been thwarted by statutes," by the legal professionI" and by the courts. Not-
withstanding these restrictions, there is evidence of the widespread practice
of labor union lawyers handling personal legal problems of officials and
members at union expense.' Analogous to the union intermediary problem
are situations where profit-motivated corporations furnish legal services to
their employees for the purpose of improving morale and reducing man-
hour losses.' Though these plans are not designed to utilize litigation as a
source of financial gain, they, like union arrangements, are barred by
statute0 and by the legal profession as the unauthorized practice of law. 1
Statutory proscriptions of the practice of law by corporations were orig-
inally applied only to pecuniary corporations offering legal services for
N.E.2d 273 (1936). In both cases pecuniary organizations circulated lists of approved
attorneys to dues-paying members and paid for their legal expenses when they became
involved in litigation arising from the use of automobiles. In neither case did the lay
agency know when a member had retained an attorney until a bill was presented nor
did it take part in the management of the litigation. In In the Matter of Maclub of
America, Inc., the contracts with the members stated that the organization would furnish
legal services while in In the Matter of Thibodeau the contracts were only to pay for the
legal services. The court concluded in the former case that the intermediary controlled
the professional services of the lawyers but held that this element was lacking in the latter
case and consequently upheld the latter arrangement. The objectionable features of both
arrangements were actually the exploitation of litigation for profit plus advertising on
behalf of the approved attorneys.
15. See cases cited note 13 supra; Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Fleck, 172 Ohio St. 467, 178
N.E.2d 782 (1961); 30 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEws 132 (1964) (cites complaint
alleging union employment of attorneys for workmen's compensation claims). A legal
aid program was established by the Los Angeles Joint Executive Board of Hotel and
Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Unions and the Restaurant-Hotel Employers'
Association of Southern California, Inc., offering legal advice on a restricted number of
civil matters and assistance in criminal cases. 1964 California Report 679-81.
16. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 14 (1957); Mo. Rv. STAT. § 484.020 (1959);
S.C. CODE §§ 56-142 (1952). Contra, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1612 (1956) (bona fide
labor organization can give legal advice to its members in matters arising out of their
employment).
17. ABA Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, Informative Opinion No. A
of 1950, 36 A.B.A.J. 677 (1950).
18. Segal, Labor Union Lawyers: Professional Services of Lawyers to Organized
Labor, 5 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 343, 361 (1952).
19. During World War II a corporation employed attorneys to handle the personal
legal problems of its employees. The corporation estimated that it saved 15,000 man-
hours in one year besides bolstering the morale of the employees. 1964 California Report
679-81.
20. For statutes see note 16 supra. Contra, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1608 (1956)
(corporation may provide legal services to its members); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 21.311
(1935) (corporations or voluntary associations may employ attorneys to assist employees).
21. ABA Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, supra note 17, at 677.
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financial gain but have been extended to non-profit organizations.23 The
statutory rule that a corporation could not practice law was interpreted
to prohibit the employment of attorneys to furnish legal services to third
parties. The courts reasoned that corporations could not do indirectly, by
hiring lawyers, what they could not do directly, practice law, and concluded
that these arrangements involved the unauthorized practice of law.24 By
strictly applying this broad rule, the courts by-passed the policy issues which
they would have been forced to face had they made an independent con-
sideration of the beneficial or detrimental aspects of non-profit organizations
furnishing legal services to their members."
II. RATIONALE BEHIND TRADITIONAL POSITION
The blanket restriction imposed upon intermediaries has been based upon
the conclusion that such methods of providing legal services would sub-
stantially injure the public and the legal profession. The detrimental effects
propounded have been the impairment of the personal and direct attorney-
client relationship, an increased possibility of conflicts of interest and
divided allegiance, the undesirable consequences of advertising and solicit-
ing, and the commercialization of the legal profession. These reasons have
been offered as the basis for barring all intermediary arrangements, but
whether they apply with equal validity to both non-profit organizations and
to enterprises offering legal services for financial gain must be examined in
order to evaluate the merits of the traditional viewpoint. Moreover, these
abuses or undesirable consequences are present in varying degrees in every
intermediary arrangement, and therefore the merits of each arrangement
should be balanced against the detrimental aspects of the particular plan.
22. E.g., People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344
I1. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); In the Matter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92
N.E. 15 (1910); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179
Adt. 139 (1935); Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327, 189
S.E. 153 (1937). In the landmark case of In the Matter of Co-operative Law Co., supra,
the court emphasized that the corporation would be organized "simply to make money"
and % ould be guided only by "the sordid purpose to earn money for stockholders." Id. at
484, 92 N.E. at 16.
23. Compare People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Motorists' Ass'n 354 Ill. 595, 188
N.E. 827 (1933), and People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers,
354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933), with People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's
Stock Yards State Bank, supra note 22.
24. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 Atl. 139
(1935); Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 115 (C.P.
1930).
25. People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187
N.E. 823 (1933); Hospital Credit Exch., Inc. v. Shapiro, 186 Misc. 658, 59 N.Y.S.2d 812
(Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1946).
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A. Impairment of Attorney-Client Relationship
Historically, each individual, using his own judgment, selected the
particular attorney he wished to employ. However, if intermediaries employ
attorneys to furnish legal services, the individual chooses only the inter-
mediary or possibly between competing lay agencies, and the organization
selects the attorney for the client. Nevertheless, after the intermediary
initially brings attorney and client together, the forming of the relationship
proceeds in the traditional manner with the acceptance of the undertaking
by an attorney, and the approval of his services by the client.2"
That the attorney-client relationship involves the highest trust and con-
fidence is a basic premise of the legal profession. It has been urged that the
employment of an attorney by a lay agency impairs this uniquely personal
and trustworthy relationship." The specter of a three party arrangement
involving an attorney, a client and an ever present intermediary has fostered
such misgivings. However, since the desired qualities of the attorney-client
relationship are brought about wholly by the character of the attorney-
client dealings, it would seem that trust and confidence could still prevail if
present standards of professional conduct are observed notwithstanding the
attorney's employment by a third party.
Another principal objection to intermediaries offering legal services is
that the public will suffer a deterioration in the quality of services offered.
Historically, the attorney received his compensation directly from his client.
If intermediaries employ members of the bar, the attorneys do not receive
their compensation from their clients, nor are their fees based upon tradi-
tional criteria, such as, the amount of time or skill required, or resulting
benefits to the client.2" The correlation between the criteria upon which
compensation is based and the quality of legal services is probably not
capable of accurate measurement, but the importance of the traditional
viewpoint seems minimal, in view of the practices of corporations, the
government and legal aid societies which compensate attorneys on an
annual salary basis. These arrangements are flourishing and have not
resulted in a noticeably inferior quality of professional services.
Also, it has been argued that the lawyer's ability to serve his client free
26. Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 87 N.W.2d 920 (Iowa 1958). But see
People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, supra note 25 (mem-
bers made complainants without consultation beyond authorization of membership appli-
cations).
27. E.g., People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102,
187 N.E. 823 (1933); In the Matter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15
(1910); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 Ati. 139
(1935).
28. See Canon 12, ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
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from outside control would be jeopardized since he might be subject to the
directions of the lay agency. 9 This apprehension of control and manage-
ment of the stages and substance of litigation by individuals other than
the client or his attorney seems warranted for instances have occurred where
the organization, rather than the client, decided the issues to be litigated.3
An attorney must serve his client with undivided allegiance and must
be free to exercise his judgment independently for the benefit of the party
he represents. When purposes or policies of the lay agency are in opposi-
tion to those of the client, and the attorney is influenced by his employer's
policies, the fears of divided allegiance, conflicts of interest and injury to the
public are justified. If, however, a non-profit organization is established to
serve the individual members, the coincidence of interests of the association
and client reduces the likelihood of divided loyalties, 1 and, in most situa-
tions, lessens the possibility of a potential weakening in the attorney's ability
to offer unbiased and independent advice. That conflicts of interests and
divided allegiance will occur cannot be doubted, 2 but it seems that the
public could be protected adequately by the existing standards of ethical
conduct that require attorneys to terminate relationships with their clients
when conflicts of interest do arise."
B. Solicitation and Advertising
Professional standards of conduct governing members of the bar condemn
solicitation, advertising and the fomenting of litigation.34 However, inter-
29. Cases cited note 27 supra; Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 167
Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937); ABA Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law,
Informative Opinion No. A of 1950, 36 A.B.A.J. 677 (1950).
30. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 447 (1963) (dissenting opinion); People ex rel.
Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933).
31. NAACP v. Button, supra note 30, at 424; see People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n
v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 II. 50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935); Dworken v. Apartment House
Owners Ass'n, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 115 (C.P. 1930). But see NAACP v. Button, supra
at 462-63 (dissenting opinion).
32. For example, suppose an NAACP lawyer is representing a Negro client in a
voting-rights case. After receiving bomb threats and a warning of a possible loss of his
job, the Negro suggests to his lawyer that he wishes to drop the case. The NAACP lawyer,
aware that this case is vital to the civil-rights movement, is faced with the conflicts of
interest and divided allegiance dilemmas.
33. See Canon 6, ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (adverse influences and
conflicting interests); Canon 44, id. (withdrawal from employment as attorney).
34. Canon 27, ABA, CANONS oF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (unprofessional to solicit by
advertising); Canon 28, id.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in
rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so ....
It is disreputable . .. to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for per-
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mediaries, not subject to the ethical standards of the legal profession, have
advertised to the public that they provide legal services. 5 The result is
unfair competition with independent members of the bar who are prohibited
from advertising their ability to provide the same services offered by
intermediaries."0 Furthermore, even if courts were able to exercise some
control over the advertising of legal services by intermediaries, as is done
with professional corporations of lawyers,'" intermediaries would, neverthe-
less, be in an advantageous position for obtaining legal business within their
specific areas by apprising their members of their legal services through
meetings and intra-organizational publications.
The restraints on advertising are also partially predicated upon the inter-
ests of the legal profession in protecting the public, for through advertising
it is likely that the most effective and resourceful advertisers, rather than
the most competent attorneys, will obtain the bulk of the business.' 8 Solicita-
tion, too, is injurious to the public if clients are led to less competent
attorneys."9 The systematic soliciting plan of the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen illuminates the potential dangers to the public. Investigators,
paid by the Brotherhood to urge injured members to employ particular
attorneys approved by the organization, visited injured railroad workers in
the hospital,4" displayed evidence of large settlements obtained by other
union members4 and carried contracts of employment.4 At one time the
sonal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them
as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes ....
Although solicitation was not censured at common law (Chreste v. Louisville Ry., 167 Ky.
75, 180 S.W. 49 (1915)), the bar's restrictions were based primarily upon the objection-
able consequences of stirring up litigation, inequitable distribution of legal business, and
the commercialization of the profession. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcS 210 (1953). See
generally Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U.
CH. L. REv. 674 (1958).
35. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. I
(1935); People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 111. 102,
187 N.E. 823 (1933); Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n, 28 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 115 (C.P. 1930).
36. Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, Report, 75 A.B.A.
REP. 242 (1950).
37. See In the Matter of the Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961).
38. Schwartz, Some Professional Problems of Law Practice 9 (1960).
39. In re Cohen, 10 I1. 2d 186, 139 N.E.2d 301 (1956).
40. Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Potts, 175 Ohio St. 101, 191 N.E.2d 728 (1963)
(injured employee signed employment contract while affected by opiates); Doughty v.
Grills, 37 Tenn. App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379 (1952).
41. In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958),
Hulse v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 340 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1960) (cn bane);
State ex rel. Beck v. Lush, 170 Neb. 376, 103 N.W.2d 136 (1960).
42. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1956); In re Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen, supra note 41.
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designated regional counsel were required to reimburse or kick-back a
portion of their fees to the Brotherhood. Even absent the requirement of
reimbursements, the channeling of remunerative cases and the desire to
continue to receive such litigation creates strong temptations for attorneys to
make voluntary payments to the intermediary.
At the same time, the possible benefits to the public from soliciting-
procurement of competent counsel and protection of legal rights-are mani-
fested by the Brotherhood plan." In the past, when the social goals of
litigation were in the public interest, solicitation and the stirring up of
litigation have been permitted.' Moreover, some advertising and solicita-
tion by intermediaries tends to rectify public ignorance of legal rights and
obligations.
C. Commercialization
The current prohibitions of the unauthorized practice of law by lay
intermediaries arose primarily from experiences with commercial enter-
prises, such as banks, collection agencies and trust companies, furnishing
legal services to their customers." The courts readily enjoined these ar-
rangements because they involved obvious commercialization and exploita-
tion of litigation for profit." Applying these same criticisms to organiza-
tions providing legal services not as a profit-making scheme, but as a service
for the financial benefit of the recipients, seems inappropriate." The col-
lateral effect of offering legal services undoubtedly benefits the organiza-
tion, for example by increasing membership or funds;" but it is certainly
not clear that this is the kind of commercialization or exploitation of the
legal processes that the profession and the courts seek to restrain.
43. Cases cited note 73 infra.
44. See Bodle, Group Legal Services: The Case for BRT, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 306-
10 (1965).
45. NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Vir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1939) (civil rights); Gunnels v. Atlanta
Bar Ass'n, 191 Ga. 366, 12 S.E.2d 602 (1940) (defending against suits by usurious
money lenders); ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND
GRIEVANCES, Opinion 148 (1935) (challenging New Deal legislation as unconstitutional).
46. See generally Note, The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Lay Organizations
Providing the Services of Attorneys, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1334 (1959).
47. E.g., State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank and Trust Co., 140 A.2d 863 (Conn.
1958) ; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,
176 N.E. 901 (1931) ; Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327,
189 S.E. 153 (1937).
48. Compare Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 115
(C.P. 1930), and Hospital Credit Exch., Inc. v. Shapiro, 186 Misc. 658, 59 N.Y.S.2d
812 (Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1946), with cases cited note 47 supra.
49. Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950); ABA, OPINIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, Opinion 8 (1925).
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The strict traditional position, failing to distinguish between profit and
non-pecuniary organizations, has been severely criticized."0 A leading scholar
suggests that the bases for the traditional viewpoint barring all intermediary
arrangements are the vested interests of the established members of the legal
profession who fear a loss of income and a channeling of clients into fewer
hands."' Perhaps more significant is the desire of the members of the legal
profession to remain uncontrolled by lay intermediaries.
III. INTERJECTION OF THE PROTECTION OF THE FIRST AMENDiENT
The traditional treatment of the intermediary problem dealt exclusively
with the interests of the legal profession and the states in maintaining high
standards of ethical conduct and in protecting the public, but, unexpectedly
in 1963, a new dimension, the freedoms of speech, petition, and association
guaranteed by the first amendment, was added as a countervailing legal
consideration.
In NAACP v. Button,52 the activities of the NAACP, recommending
attorneys retained by the organization and furnishing legal services for
members and non-members, were judically sustained as "modes of ex-
pression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth amendments
which Virginia may not prohibit, under its power to regulate the legal pro-
fession .... ,,
The NAACP, a non-profit membership corporation established to pro-
mote the civil rights of the Negro populace, was actively engaged in en-
couraging and assisting litigation that furthered its express purposes. The
State of Virginia, as part of its "massive resistance" to integration, amended
its statutes 4 regulating the professional conduct of attorneys so that any
organization retaining lawyers was prohibited from soliciting legal business
50. Hildebrand v. State Bar, supra note 49 at 515, 521, 225 P.2d at 514, 518 (Carter
and Traynor, JJ., dissenting opinions); Turrentine, Legal Service for the Lower-Income
Group, 29 ORE. L. REv. 20, (1949) ; Weihofen, supra note 8.
51. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 167 (1953).
52. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
53. Id. at 428-29.
In 1934, it was suggested that the freedom of assembly guaranteed individuals "the
right to band together to employ a lawyer in their corporate name." Wcihofcn, supra
note 8, at 131.
54. Six other Southern states passed similar legislation that classified the activities
of the NAACP as barratrous. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-703 to -713 (Supp. 1964);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 877.01-.02 (Supp. 1964); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-4701 to -4703
(Supp. 1963); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 2049-01 to -08 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-521
to -525 (1962); and TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3405 to -3410 (Supp. 1964).
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in which it had no pecuniary right or liability. The NAACP instituted
legal action to have the amendments declared inapplicable to its activities
or if applicable, unconstitutional. The Virginia Supreme Court held that
the statute was constitutional as applied to the NAACP and that the state
could prohibit the NAACP or its members from soliciting "legal business
for their attorneys or any particular attorneys. ' ' " But at the same time, the
court sustained the organization's right to inform its members of their rights
and the advisability of asserting those rights. The Supreme Court of the
United States, in a divided opinion, reversed, holding the statute uncon-
stitutional.Y The majority believed that the statutory prohibition of the
solicitation of legal business in this context could be used as an instrument
to impede NAACP members and lawyers from informing people of their
legal rights and the advisability of asserting such rights, thereby infringing
upon the freedom of expression preserved by the first amendment."
A separate issue, not necessarily before the Court, yet nevertheless decided,
was the legality of the NAACP's employment of a legal staff to handle
litigation for its members and non-members, a manifest violation of Canon
55 Chapter 33 amended and reenacted VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-74, 54-78, 54-79
(1958 Replacement).
Section 54-74 provides in part:
(6) "Any malpractice or any unlawful or dishonest or unworthy or corrupt or
unprofessional conduct, . . . shall . . . include the improper solicitation of any
legal or professional business or employment, either directly or indirectly, or the
acceptance of employment . . . from any . . . organization or association with
knowledge that such . . .organization or association has violated any provision of
article 7 of this chapter [which includes §§ 54-78 to 54-83.1] . . . . (amended
parts underlined).
Section 54-78 provides in part:
(1) A "runner" or "capper" is any person, corporation, partnership or associa-
tion acting in any manner or in any capacity as an agent for an attorney at law
within this State or for any . . . organization or association which employs,
retains or compensates any attorney at law in connection with any judicial pro-
ceedings in which such - . . organization or association is not a party and in which
it has no pecuniary right or liability, in the solicitation or procurement of business
for such attorney at law .... (amended parts underlined).
Section 54-79 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, corporation, partnership or association to act
as a runner or capper as defined in § 54-78 to solicit any business for an attorney
at law or such person, partnership, corporation, organization or association ....
(amended parts underlined).
Canons 35 and 47, ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, were also incorporated
into Virginia law. VA. SuP. CT. APP. R. pt. VI, Rule II, §§ 35, 47.
56. NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 164-65, 116 S.E.2d 55, 72 (1960).
57. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), reversing in part sub. nom. NAACP v.
Harrison, supra note 56.
58. Moreover, the breadth and vagueness of the statue made it capable of being used
for "broadly curtailing group activity leading to litigation." NAACP v. Button, supra
note 57, at 436.
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35. Undoubtedly, the Court's decision was influenced considerably by the
fact that the efficacy of the NAACP's overall program rested substantially
upon approval of its legal arrangement. Prima facie, it seemed that the
Court condoned this arrangement and created a narrow exception to Canon
35 because "in the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique
of resolving private differences; it is a means of achieving the lawful objec-
tives of equality of treatment.... It is thus a form of political expression.""
But, in addition, the Court founded its exception upon a far broader con-
sideration-the absence of those abuses traditionally cited in support of the
bar against intermediaries offering legal services. The effect of this approach
is to engender serious doubt as to the future propriety of rigidly applying
Canon 35 to prohibit all intermediary arrangements. First, the opinion stated
that "objection to the intervention of a lay intermediary.., derives from the
element of pecuniary gain,"60 and in this situation there was an absence of
monetary considerations that might lead to subversion of the client's inter-
ests. Secondly, the majority felt that the similarity of interests of the NAACP
and the Negro litigants dispelled the dangers of conflicts of interest or biased
advice. The Court also found no showing of "any injurious intervention in
or control of litigation."'" Finally, commercialization of the legal profession
was obviously not a valid criticism of this arrangement. Thus the Court
concluded that the NAACP arrangement was justified within the tradi-
tional concepts of professional ethics. Whether the above reasoning would
be applied to other intermediaries, especially where litigation was not a
means of "political expression," was, however, left unsettled. The effect of
repeated resort to this type of analysis would be to undermine the continuing
vitality of Canon 35.
However, instead of relying upon the absence of the traditional abuses
or dangers in intermediary arrangements, the Court expressly chose to rest
its decision protecting the intermediary arrangement of the NAACP upon
the first amendment freedoms of expression and association. 2 In effect, the
conglomerate safeguards of the freedoms of expression, petition and associa-
tion were expanded to encompass the legal arrangement of the NAACP.
The persuasive dissenting opinion, written by Justice Harlan and accepted
by Justices Clark and Stewart, rejected the majority's expansive approach
to the first amendment freedoms and would not have permitted the
NAACP's legal arrangement. Although agreeing that the freedoms of associ-
ation and expression were at issue, the gist of the dissent was that the state
59. Id. at 429.
60. Id. at 441.
61. Id. at 444.
62. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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had a paramount interest in the manner of legal representation within its
territory" which far outweighed any potential or remote abridgement of
first amendment freedoms. The dissent's position was based largely upon a
finding of facts, the antithesis of the majority's appraisal, which supported
the traditional reasons for barring intermediaries from furnishing legal ser-
vices: (1) the NAACP's subjection of its attorneys to its ideological dictates
might lead to conflicts of interest, divided allegiance and biased advice, (2)
its control of "the form of pleading, the type of relief to be requested, and
the proper timing of suits""4 encroached upon normal attorney-client func-
tions, (3) it fomented specific types of litigation and finally (4) there was
an absence of personal contacts between staff lawyers and their clients.
Moreover, the dissent's viewpoint was supported by the relevant state pre-
cedents."
The full impact and import of Button became more evident by explana-
tory references concerning the case made in Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen
v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar.6 The allusions made to Button"
suggest that that holding will not be confined to legalize only inter-
mediaries employing litigation as a means of political expression," but
might also be applied to sanction other intermediary arrangements where
litigation is used to settle private disputes.
The issue confronting the Supreme Court in the Brotherhood case was
analogous to one in Button: could a non-profit intermediary advise its
members of their legal rights and systematically recommend particular
attorneys?" At stake was the controversial plan of the Brotherhood of Rail-
63. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 455 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
64. Id. at 450 (dissenting opinion). Justice White in a separate opinion concurred
with the dissent that these practices would not be constitutionally protected. He believed
they were not present, however.
65. Id. at 458-60 & n.7.
66. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
67. "In fact, in that case [Button], unlike this one, the attorneys were actually em-
ployed by the association which recommended them, and recommendations were made
to nonmembers." Id. at 7. Commenting upon the practice of unions in England, the
Court stated, "they [unions] retain counsel, paid by the union, to represent members in
personal lawsuits, a practice similar to that which we upheld in NAACP v. Button."
Id. at 7. (Footnotes omitted.)
68. The dissenting opinion would have so limited the Button case.
69. Although the Brotherhood did not employ and directly compensate the lawyers,
as in the NAACP arrangement, the objectionable features of the union's plan are not
lessened. The regional counsel, dependent upon the intermediary as a source of
business, are faced with the divided allegiance, conflicts of interest, and disinterested
advice dilemmas. The undesirable consequences of advertising and soliciting are
present. Furthermore, because the intermediary has control over the channeling of litiga-
tion, and hence can regulate the income of the designated counsel, pressures can be
exerted upon the lawyers and their handling of particular litigation.
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road Trainmen,"' established in 1930 to realize the rights granted to railroad
workers under the Federal Employer's Liability Act."' The Brotherhood,
acting as an intermediary, designated approved counsel throughout the
country and effected the attorney-client relationship by solicitation72 and
economic pressure. 3 Upon the grounds of freedom of association the Court,
in a divided opinion, sustained "the right of the workers personally or
through a special department of their Brotherhood to advise concerning the
need for legal assistance-and most importantly, what lawyer a member
could confidently rely on" as "an inseparable part of this constitutionally
guaranteed right to assist and advise each other."74 The Court cited the
Button case as support for its holding even though in Button freedom of ex-
pression was the primary consideration and the significance of freedom of
association in reaching that decision was rather nebulous. The fact that
forty-five bar associations across the country petitioned the Court for a re-
70. Previous to the plan, railroad employees with claims against their employers were
often charged exorbitant fees by incompetent attorneys or were subjected to undue
pressure from railroad claim agents to settle for unfair amounts. See generally Bodle,
supra note 44, at 306-12.
71. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
72. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1956); In re O'Neill,
5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933); Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508
(1950); Hulse v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 340 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1960) (en bane)
(consent decree); In re Petition of Comm. on Rule 28 of Cleveland Bar Ass'n, 15 Ohio L.
Abs. 106 (Ct. App. 1933); Doughty v. Grills, 37 Tenn. App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379 (1952).
Contra, Hildebrand v. State Bar, supra at 521, 225 P.2d at 518 (Traynor, J., dissenting
opinion); Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 Il. App. 364 (1932). The court in In re
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E. 2d 163 (1958) sustained
the Brotherhood's practice of informing members of the advisability of obtaining legal
advice and its practice of recommending and referring litigation to attorneys designated
by the union without explicitly condoning solicitation.
73. The Brotherhood fixed the maximum contingent fee charged by the regional
counsel at a lower rate than the standard charge. Moreover, to offset the cost of the
Legal Aid Department, the Brotherhood utilized the following progression of fee-splitting
arrangements: Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note 72 (contingent fee contract of
14% for attorney, 6% for union); In re O'Neill, supra note 72 (15% for attorney,
5% for union); Hildebrand v. State Bar, supra note 72 (19% to attorney, 6% to
union); In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, supra note 72 (attorneys received 25%
but required to pay investigators for services). In In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,
all financial connection between the union and the regional counsel was enjoined and
supposedly terminated although some doubt still prevails. See Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (dissenting
opinion).
74. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, supra
note 73, at 6. But cf. McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107 (1920) (constitutionality of
statute forbidding solicitation upheld); Barton v. State Bar, 209 Cal. 677, 289 Pac. 818
(1930); Hightower v. Detroit Edison Co., 262 Mich. 1, 247 N.W. 97 (1933).
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hearing of this case"' can be attributed in part to the utilization by the
Court of such an unorthodox interpretation of the freedom of association
without substantial elucidation.
Lastly, the Court envisioned no "appreciable public interest" that
justified barring the activities of the Brotherhood within the scope of
Virginia's power to regulate the legal profession. In rebuttal, the dissenting
opinion voiced support for the traditional viewpoint and emphasized the
deleterious aspects of this arrangement, such as the lay agency's control over
the appointment and dismissal of the attorneys, the fees to be charged and
the handling of litigation, the gross abuses of channeling and soliciting and
the commercialization of the legal profession.7G
Reading the Brotherhood case in conjunction with Button, it is possible
to forsee a fundamental transformation in the existing structure of the
legal profession. Constitutional safeguards were employed to sanction two
non-profit intermediary arrangements, one employing attorneys and the
other recommending specific attorneys. The concept of freedom of associa-
tion was expanded to encompass not only the right to belong and "to engage
in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas,"7 but also
implicitly to include the right systematically to recommend and refer litiga-
tion to specific attorneys.7" Moreover, the shield of freedom of association
includes "the right of the workers personally or through a special department
of their Brotherhood to advise... what lawyer a member could confidently
rely on.... .""' Thus an organization or its members through the freedom of
association vested in the individual members may engage in certain activities
that would be illegal if done by individuals divorced from any associa-
tion."°
75. 30 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 92 (1964).
76. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1,
9-12 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
77. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (compelled dis-
closure of membership lists would curtail freedom to associate); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960). See generally RICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (1962).
78. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1
(1964); see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
79. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, supra note
78, at 6. (Emphasis added.)
80. This paradox is best illustrated by an example. Suppose X, a member of the
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, doubted the competence of the regional counsel ap-
pointed by the Brotherhood but judged his brother, an attorney for thirty years, to be the
"best in the business." Consequently, X visited each injured member of the union and
recommended that he employ his brother to manage any claims against the railroad.
The motive, execution, and purpose of this scheme is identical to the arrangement in
the Brotherhood case. It is conceded that the conception of this plan originates from an
individual and the Brotherhood plan is the result of the combined efforts of the organiza-
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Neither the Brotherhood nor Button case specifically states that solicitation
by the organization is protected. A distinction was made between (1)
recommending and (2) urging, advocating or soliciting, permitting only
the former. Upon remand of the Brotherhood case, the lower Virginia court
adhered to this distinction, decreeing that advice and recommendation were
permissible but explicitly barring solicitation and channeling."1 However, it
is unrealistic to classify as something other than solicitation the habitual and
systematic recommendation of specific attorneys without any request for
such recommendation. 2 Yet, the practice of the Brotherhood approved by
the Supreme Court entails exactly such "recommendations." Moreover, it
is highly unlikely that the Brotherhood will merely recommend its regional
counsel rather than effectively advocate their employment.8 3
The interjection of constitutional rights into the area of group legal
services has created an urgent need for a rewriting and re-evaluation of the
ethical standards of the legal profession embodied in Canons 28,"' 35,"5
and 47. s6 The scope of constitutional protection covering attorneys, lay
intermediaries, and the activities of members of such organizations has not
been well defined. The initiative of the legal profession to establish its own
guidelines of professional conduct has been challenged. In rewriting the
Canons of Ethics the bar should take cognizance of the rights of individuals,
the duty of the profession to serve the public, and the interests of inter-
mediary organizations.
tion. But the right of the members to advise and recommend is a personal right, free
from rigid compliance to the dictates of the organizational hierarchy.
X is clearly soliciting; yet his activities are seemingly protected for "the right of the
workers personally... to advise concerning the need for legal assistance-and, most im-
portantly, what lawyer a member could confidently rely on-is an inseparable part of
this constitutionally guaranteed right to advise and assist each other." Existing rules
condemning solicitation have been designed to prevent exactly this type of channeling
and commercialization of the legal profession. A fortiori, the linkage of members of the
legal profession to a department of a union with the power to channel an enormous
volume of litigation is susceptible to corruption, favoritism, and political and economic
pressures.
81. 30 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 296-98 (1964).
82. COSTIGAN, THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND ITS ETHics 359 (1933).
83. Brief for Respondent, pp. 20-40, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel.
Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); Brief for Respondent (Petition for Rehearing),
pp. 3-10, id.
84. See note 34 supra. Particular attention should be paid to the criteria propounded
by the Supreme Court. "Malicious intent was of the essence of the common-law offenses
of fomenting or stirring up litigation." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963).
(Footnotes omitted.) "Even more modem . . . regulations which reflect hostility to stir-
ring up litigation have been aimed chiefly at those who urge recourse to the courts for
private gain, serving no public interest." Id. at 440. (Footnotes omitted.)
85. Canon cited note 6 supra.
86. Canon cited note 7 supra.
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IV. NECESSARY SAFEGUARDS
To illustrate future problems connected with intermediaries some hypo-
thetical examples will be utilized.
(1) Two enterprising young attorneys, suffering financially because of
intra-legal competition, conceive the Apartment House Owners Association,
a non-profit organization whose purpose is to furnish legal services to all
dues-paying members for legal matters connected with the common interests
(leases, evictions, etc.) of the members. The attorneys fix their annual
compensation to include any excess income above expenses and at a
minimum annual salary of $25,000. The organization attracts five thousand
interested parties."
The first question that must be answered is whether all non-profit or-
ganizations may employ attorneys to represent their individual members
in personal law suits. NAACP v. Button" hints that such arrangements are
acceptable if traditional standards of ethics (excluding Canons 35 and 47)
are not violated and the organization's policies are in accord with the
interests of its members." However, the holding in Button is doubtful
authority for the above proposition because of the inextricable significance of
the freedom of expression in that case. The constitutional right espoused in
the Brotherhood case protects the freedom to associate and to recommend
specific attorneys but does not guarantee the organization's right to employ
attorneys, although the Court suggested that this practice would be sus-
tained."0 Thus the Court has not yet sanctioned the employment of attorneys
by all non-profit organizations.
If the employment of attorneys by non-profit intermediaries would be
permitted, the decision would have far-reaching consequences if based upon
constitutional grounds, i.e., protected by the combined safeguards of the
first amendment freedoms of speech, petition, and association. The result
of such a decision would be to overturn a significant body of state law bar-
ring intermediary arrangements." But if the concept of first amendment
87. Although the similarity to Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n, 28 Ohio
N.P. (n.s.) 115 (C.P. 1930) is obvious, it should not be inferred that this actually
occurred in that situation.
88. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
89. See p. 324 supra.
90. See note 67 supra.
91. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 1
(1935); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Motorists' Ass'n, 354 Ill. 595, 188 N.E.
827 (1933); People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill.
102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933); Hospital Credit Exch., Inc. v. Shapiro, 186 Misc. 658, 59
N.Y.S.2d 812 (Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1946); Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n,
28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 115 (C.P. 1930).
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freedoms is not expanded to permit non-profit intermediaries to employ
attorneys, the bar associations and state courts would be left to decide
individually whether the public interest necessitated the broad prohibition
presently existing. It is submitted that a blanket ban is unduly restrictive and
that the social utility of each arrangement should be balanced against the
possible injury to the public and the legal profession.
Finally, if non-pecuniary intermediary arrangements are to be allowed,
restrictions will have to be imposed in order to prevent subterfuges for
financial gain. A minimum requirement for every approved arrangement
should be that it is primarily designed to benefit the members and not to
obtain clients and pecuniary gain for those controlling the organization. 2
An organization established by the members is more likely to fall into this
category than a plan instituted by individual attorneys.
(2) Assume the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen is permitted to retain
attorneys. The Brotherhood enlarges its legal staff to enable it to represent
and advise dues-paying members in all civil matters. The purpose of the
plan is to assure the railroad workers of competent counsel to protect and
enforce their legal rights.
In the Button case, the scope of litigation was confined to matters of
significance to the entire membership, issues transcending the personal
interests of the individual parties involved.93 Similarly, advice relating to
matters common to all members of trade associations could be made by
attorneys employed by the association."4 The sphere of litigation in the
Brotherhood case involved matters of a recurring nature that were common
to the members, and also that were peculiar to the group's common bonds;"5
the purview of litigation provided in most intermediary arrangements will
probably fall within this classification. 6 Confining the permissible scope of
92. See Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950) (Carter, J.,
dissenting opinion).
93. Compare People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354
Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933) (constitutionality of real estate taxes imposed upon all
members was attacked).
94. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMsIsTTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES,
Opinion 168 (1937); id., Opinion 273 (1946). Both opinions stressed that legal advice
could not be given on individual problems of the members.
95. Both Button and Brotherhood were limited to litigation involving federal rights
but it is illogical to assume that the protection of the first amendment will be restricted
in such a manner so as not to include state rights and obligations.
96. E.g., People ex tel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199
N.E. 1 (1935); People ex tel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Motorists' Ass'n, 354 Ill. 595, 188
N.E. 827 (1933); Hospital Credit Exch., Inc. v. Shapiro, 186 Misc. 658, 59 N.Y.S.2d
812 (Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1946); Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n, 28 Ohio
N.P. (n.s.) 115 (C.P. 1930).
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litigation in this manner offers to the intermediary and the individuals the
benefits of volume, specialization, and resulting efficiency.
In the hypothetical case above, the breadth of litigation has widened and
the resulting impact upon the existing institutions of the legal profession be-
comes more pronounced. If, for example, the Brotherhood's attorneys
drafted wills for the members, it might be difficult to justify barring these
legal services solely on the ground that these needs did not arise out of
the common bonds that brought the members together. The legal services
are still being handled by members of the bar and are offered not for profit
but for the benefit of the recipients. Extending this reasoning to its logical
end, the protection of all legal rights should fall within the range of permis-
sible activities by intermediariesY It is at this point that the legal profession
would be seriously alarmed at the potentially voluminous shift of litigation
from independent practitioners to intermediaries.
(3) As a result of a collective bargaining agreement, General Matters
Corporation is to provide free legal services as a fringe benefit for its one
hundred thousand employees. The corporation decides to employ its own
staff of attorneys to represent employees."5
If the employees' union had undertaken to employ attorneys to provide
legal services, the opinion in the Brotherhood case suggests that this arrange-
ment would be approved."0 Is the situation any different because the burden
of expense has been shifted to a profit-making corporation? The corpora-
tion would have a bona fide interest in improving morale and saving actual
man-hours of work by preventing legal entanglements.' If the corporation
would offer legal services not directly for profit and if the attorney-client
relationship were personal and direct with no conflicts of interest, approval
of this type of plan has been suggested.' However, there are persuasive
arguments against permitting these arrangements. Difficulties might arise
in separating the corporation's legal department from the legal department
for the employees. Control of one office might spread to control over both
for the financial interests of the corporation. There is nothing to assure the
employees that the corporation will secure the most competent attorneys.
Also, the cost burden may be shifted to the general public instead of falling
97. Public policy arguments would probably prevent intermediaries from furnishing
legal services for criminal and divorce cases because providing unlimited legal services
in such instances might encourage crimes or divorces.
98. A survey of the legal profession revealed evidence that situations do exist where
corporations furnish legal services for their employees in spite of general prohibitions.
McCracken, Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional Standards, 37
VA. L. REV. 399, 418 (1951).
99. See note 67 supra.
100. See note 19 supra.
101. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 163 (1953); 1964 California Report 727.
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upon the recipients of the legal services. Another factor to be weighed before
endorsing these arrangements is the magnitude of the disruptive effect upon
the existing institutions, individual offices and law firms, providing legal
services. In addition, the independence of the legal profession would be re-
duced significantly.
CONCLUSION
The failure of existing legal units to meet the needs of middle and lower
income classes has been revealed by surveys, °1 2 recognized by the legal pro-
fession,.. and noted by scholars.' o4 Understandably, the public is turning
to a new medium to fill the gap in needed legal services. The increasing
individual association with and confidence in groups have led to substantial
reliance on these organizations for the legal services which in the past had
been acquired on an individual basis. However, the attempts by these
organizations to offer legal services0 5 have been obstructed by the legal
profession's strict adherence to the sanctity of the traditional individual
lawyer-client relationship.
Professional standards of ethics are flexible guidelines by which the pro-
fession believes it can most effectively serve the public interest and fairly
administer justice while preserving the dignity of the profession. The stan-
dards barring intermediaries must be re-examined in the light of changing
102. The Lawyer and the Public: An A.A.L.S. Survey, 47 YALE L.J. 1272 (1938);
Koos, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW at i (1948).
In England, the gap between the need for legal services by the lower-income groups
and the actual procuring of such services has been lessened by a government-sponsored
plan under the Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949. A basic premise of this plan is that
no one should be deprived of legal advice or legal representation because of a lack of
means. The essential elements of the plan are that individuals are required to pay
according to what they can afford, the members of the legal profession are directly
remunerated by the State, only a limited number of civil actions are within the scope
of the plan, and the administration of the system is controlled by the legal profession.
Although the government acts as an intermediary, the plan has not been attacked as
undermining the ethics of the legal profession or the normal attorney-client relationship.
This reference to the English plan is made not to suggest that the plan might be practical
here in the United States but to emphasize the recognized difficulties of lower-income
classes in obtaining legal services and to mention one response to the problem.
DUCHAMEL, SOME PILLARS OF ENGLISH LAW 168-73 (1959); Lund, The Legal Aid and
Advice Scheme, 4 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 77 (1949); Smith, English Legal Assistance
Plan: Its Significance for American Legal Institutions, 35 A.B.A.J. 453 (1949).
103. See ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEV-
ANCES, Opinion 191 (1939); id., Opinion 205 (1940).
104. Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Classes, 63
COLUm. L. REv. 973 (1963); Turrentine, Legal Service for the Lower-Income Group,
29 ORE. L. REv. 20 (1949).
105. "There seems to be a growing recognition of the desire of associations, whether
for profit or otherwise, to retain the services of an attorney and have him available for
representation of individual members of the group." McCracken, supra note 98, at 418.
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conditions and the inadequacies of the present system. In the past, excep-
tions to the prohibition against intermediaries have been made. The public
interest in providing legal services for the indigent necessitated the approval
of legal aid societies. ' Economic utility was the basis for permitting the
incorporation of lawyers.' Liability insurance companies are allowed to
employ attorneys to defend actions against individual policyholders,
although these arrangements violate the Canon prohibiting intermediaries.
Justification has been premised on the common financial interest of insurer
and insured,"'s but in fact situations arise where this element is lacking'
and where conflicts of interest are present."' If the raison d'etre for an
organization is the benefit of its members through aid in legal matters, is
this not as compelling an argument as a common financial interest to insure
competent and loyal, legal representation?
Moreover, intermediaries may remedy some of the weaknesses in
traditional relationships between the public and the legal profession. It has
been argued that intermediaries increase the public's awareness of legal
problems, expedite the contacting process, and reduce legal costs."' These
factors must outweigh the policies comprehended by the traditional norms if
intermediaries of a limited nature are to be permitted. The first essential
step towards effecting an attorney-client relationship is recognition of a legal
106. E.g., N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A: 170-82 (1953); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.311
(1937); LA. REV. STAT. § 37:213 (1964); Azzarello v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 117 Ohio App.
471, 185 N.E.2d 566 (1962).
A new approach to the problem of providing legal services to the indigent has resulted
from the passing of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. As part of government-
sponsored community-action programs, non-profit neighborhood offices, employing at-
torneys, %%ill offer legal assistance to the indigent in civil matters peculiar to the poverty-
stricken, such as fraudulent finance practices, welfare benefits, etc. An essential element
of the plan will be the education of the underprivileged in their legal rights by speeches,
advertising, and solicitation. Although the traditional arguments for prohibiting inter-
mediaries-potential lay control over lawyers and litigation, divided allegiance, conflicts
of interest, solicitation and the stirring up of litigation-are especially applicable to this
evolving plan, the public welfare has transcended the importance of the traditional
ethical standards of the legal profession. See The Role of the Bar Association of St.
Louis in the Anti-Poverty Program Under the Economic Opportunity Act, St. Louis B.J.,
Spring 1965, pp. 11-25.
107. In the Matter of the Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d. 554 (Fla. 1961) (lawyers per-
mitted to practice in corporate form to gain tax benefits) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106V, §§
101-110 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 801-19 (Supp. 1962)
(Professional Corporation Act).
108. Matter of Kelsey, 186 App. Div. 95, 73 N.Y. Supp. 860 (1919) ; ABA, OPINIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, Opinion 282 (1950).
109. E.g., American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 205 Misc.
1066, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1954) (coverage limit of policy exhausted).
110. E.g., O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P.2d 483 (1946).
111. 1964 California Report 662. See generally id. at 660-69.
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problem. Through advertisements, meetings or personal associations, inter-
mediaries create or reinforce public awareness of problems requiring legal as-
sistance. The education of the public with respect to legal rights and obliga-
tions is unquestionably desirable. Intertwined with creating awareness of
legal problems is the informing of individuals of the easy accessibility of com-
petent attorneys. Recognition by the legal profession of this problem of con-
tacting is manifested by the increasing number of lawyer referral systems.
Intermediaries expedite and simplify the difficult process of choosing and
contacting dependable and trustworthy attorneys.
Perhaps the most important function of intermediaries is to offer individ-
uals more economical legal services. Membership organizations, supported
by dues, utilize the insurance principle of spreading the risk. Also increased
volumes of business in specialized areas produce efficiency of operation. In
fact, intermediaries may offer the only access to legal representation in areas
of the law where the expenses of legal services may exceed the financial
rewards of redressing one's rights." 2 But a result of reducing the cost of
legal services and increasing the accessibility of attorneys might be to pro-
voke unnecessary litigation which otherwise would be settled privately by
the parties.
A final caveat must be considered. Intermediaries could have a poten-
tially profound influence upon the role of the legal profession in our society.
The preservation of an independent legal profession enables the mem-
bers to advocate reforms and solutions for political and social issues based
solely upon their individual convictions.'13 Group legal services would add to
the creeping abridgement of the independence of lawyers from partisan in-
terests. Subtle restrictions upon freedoms of expression and action would be
imposed upon those members of the legal profession forced to maintain the
security and image of loyal and dedicated employees." 4 Moreover, the sub-
jection of attorneys to the control of lay agencies and the concomitant re-
moval of these lawyers from intra-legal competition for clients eliminates the
inducement to enhance one's reputation among potential clients by entering
positions of civic responsibility, legislative roles and political offices."'
Ultimately, increasing numbers of the legal profession would be motivated
to further the interests of organizational employers and their constituents in
contrast to dedication to the general public welfare.
112. See People ex tel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 I11. 50,
199 N.E. 1 (1935); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Motorists' Ass'n, 354 Ill. 595,
188 N.E. 827 (1933); Dworken v. Cleveland Auto. Club, 29 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 607
(C.P. 1931).
113. See HURST, THE GROWTH OF AmERICAN LAW 366-67 (1950).
114. See Swaine, Impact of Big Business on the Profession: An Answer to Critics of
the Modern Bar, 35 A.B.A.J. 89, 171 (1949).
115. See BLAUSTEIN & PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 98 (1954).
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